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WALL STREET AS YOSSARIAN: THE OTHER
EFFECTS OF THE RAJARATNAM INSIDER
TRADING CONVICTION
J. Scott Colesanti*

I.

INTRODUCTION

"Without warning, the patient sat up in bed and shouted, 'I see
1
everything twice! -

And thus Yossarian, the war-weary bomber pilot of the masterful
novel, Catch-22, was able to malinger in an Italian hospital even longer
2
while nervous doctors attended to the strange malady of his neighbor.
The storied literary diversion may highlight the good fortune of
those evading government prosecution of financial crimes in 2011, a
year that fulfilled the promise that observers of hedge fund discipline
would similarly see things twice. To wit, in May 2011, a Manhattan jury
convicted billionaire hedge fund entrepreneur Raj Rajaratnam of
fourteen counts of conspiracy and securities fraud.3 Chief among these
convictions was the crime of insider trading.4 The case punctuated two
years of criminal actions based upon insider trading allegations by the
U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, who had called
*
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1. JOSEPH HELLER, CA1rCH-22, at 177 (1989).
2. See id. at 176-78.
3. Peter J. Henning, How Serious a Crime Is Insider Trading?, DEALBOOK (Aug. 10, 2011,
3:30 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/10/how-serious-a-crime-is-insider-trading/; Peter
Lattman, Galleon ChiefSentenced to 11-Year Term in Insider Case, DEALBOOK (Oct. 13, 2011,
9:14 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/rajaratnam-is-sentenced-to-I 1-years/.
4. Lattman, supranote 3.
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Rajaratnam "the modem face of illegal insider trading."5 Perhaps more
significantly, five months later, Judge Richard J. Holwell sentenced
Rajaratnam to eleven years in prison, in handing down the harshest
sentence ever in such a case. 7
The Rajaratnam trial was the climax to a prolonged investigation
that resulted in the conviction of over two dozen hedge fund workers and
public company/financial firm employees for their roles in a $50 million
scheme. 8 The case also emphasized the unforgiving nature of securities
fraud accusations where those who should know better (for example,
attorneys) were concerned, as lawyers ensnared in the net cast at the
fallen Galleon Management, LP ("Galleon") received consistently
glaring prison sentences. 9 Further, the Rajaratnam conviction seemingly
reverberated through the courts, leading to strict interpretations of
procedural rules attending unrelated insider trading cases.' 0
But the celebrated conviction failed to end the parallel U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC" or the "Commission")
investigation, litigation, or its pursuit of both fine and disgorgement."
Thus, while commentators accurately noted that the use of Department
5. Ex-Hedge Fund Boss Sentenced to 11 Years in Prison, NPR (Oct. 13, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/10/13/141311454/u-s-seeks-record-sentence-for-ex-hedge-fund-boss
(internal quotation marks omitted); Lattman, supra note 3 (detailing charges against fifty-four
individuals, fifty of whom either pleaded guilty or were convicted).
6. Ex-Hedge Fund Boss Sentenced to 11 Years in Prison, supra note 5; Lattman, supra
note 3.
7. Lattman, supra note 3. While another defendant in the scheme focusing on Galleon
Management, LP previously received a ten-year sentence, the article notes that "[t]he average
sentence of the 13 other defendants connected to Mr. Rajaratnam's case has been about three years."
Id.
8. Judge Sentences Hedge Fund Worker to Prison,N.Y. L.J, Sept. 1, 2011, at 1 (detailing the
six and a half year sentence meted to hedge fund worker Craig Drimal for his role in "the largest
hedge fund insider-trading case in history"). Speaking more globally, in 2010 and 2011, Manhattan
prosecutors charged fifty-two individuals with insider trading, forty-nine of whom pleaded guilty or
were convicted. Peter Lattman, Latest Trial Set to Begin in Insider Trading Inquiry, DEALBOOK
(Aug. 30, 2011, 8:22 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/latest-trial-set-to-begin-ininsider-trading-inquiry/.
9. See, e.g., Mark Hamblett, Another Attorney Sentenced in Insider Trading Scheme, N.Y.
L.J., Oct. 13, 2011, at 1 (describing the sentences of lawyer defendants of prison terms ranging from
two and a half years to ten years for their roles in trading money for inside information stolen from
the law firm of Ropes & Gray LLP). The judge noted that one of the lawyer attorneys (although
non-practicing) "[u]nderstood better than most the illegality of this kind of conduct." Id.(internal
quotation marks omitted).
For purposes of this Article, the term "inside information" is interchangeable with its
juridical counterpart, "material, non-public information."
10. See, e.g., United States v. Gansman, 657 F.3d 85, 90-92, 94-95 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding no
reversible error in insider trading case where, inter alia, the trial judge permitted cross examination
on polygraph tests as well as a "slightly modified version of the charge" to the jury where the charge
requested by the defense and decrying polygraph tests were equally permissible).
11. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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of Justice ("DOJ") wiretaps changed the nature of both the game and the
results for Wall Street's illegal players, 12 receiving less attention is the
delaying effect the trial had-both on clarifying insider trading law and
questioning the unchecked use of government resources. 3 While no one
could quibble with the efficiency of the DOJ's results, this Article seeks
to reveal their equally significant effects on the government's ongoing
14
crusade against insider trading. Born via an administrative decision,
decades after the adoption of the securities laws themselves, 15 the
uniquely American insider trading prohibition (and the attendant efforts
of its chief enforcer) became perhaps a little more unique and
problematic with the U.S. Attorney's 2011 conviction of Rajaratnam.

II.

THE UNITED STATES (AND THE UNITED STATES) AGAINST
RAJ RAJARATNAM

Rajaratnam was the founder and Managing General Partner of
Galleon, a fourteen-year-old, multi-billion dollar adviser to a short list of
eponymous hedge funds ("Galleon Funds"). 16 His success is wellchronicled in biblical terms; indeed, his net worth (and immigrant status)
punctuate most stories of his downfall.' 7
A. The Accusations
The SEC's amended complaint ("2009 SEC Complaint") filed in
2009 against Rajaratnam and Galleon named nineteen other entities and
individuals ("Galleon Defendants") alleged to form the hedge fund

12. See, e.g., Ellen C. Brotman & Erin C. Dougherty, Blue Collar Tactics in White Collar
Cases, CHAMPION, Sept. 2011, at 16, 16 ("Lawyers can expect white collar cases to be less about
the paper and more about the snitches and their tape recordings.").
13. See id.at 19-20 (quoting Enforcement Cooperation Initiative, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/
spotlight/enfcoopinitiative.shtml (last modified Nov. 2, 2011)).
14. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 907, 913-14 (1961) (affirming the SEC theory
that trading on the basis of inside information constituted securities fraud).
15. See, e.g., ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 55 (1982) ("The 1964 [federal securities law]
amendments, ... coupled with the legal principles enunciated in the Cady, Roberts case, changed
the thrust and direction of securities law regulation and greatly expanded the SEC's horizons.").
Professor Roberta Karmel, an SEC Commissioner between 1977 and 1980, has been an open and
consistent critic of aggressive enforcement. Id. at 15-17, 259 ("[A]s I have repeatedly stressed, I do
not believe that federal securities regulation is properly justifiable solely as a consumer protection
device.").
16. Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 2, 8, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, 2011
WL 5374112 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8,2011) (No. 09 Civ. 8811 (JSR)) [hereinafter 2009 SEC Complaint].
17. See George Packer, A Dirty Business: New York City's Top Prosecutor Takes on Wall
Street Crime, NEW YORKER, June 27, 2011, at 42, 42, 55 ("[The SEC] budget this year falls short of
Raj Rajaratnam's net worth at the time of his arrest.").
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chief's broad and ongoing network of corporate informants.18 One
Galleon Defendant was Danielle Chiesi, a registered broker and portfolio
analyst at an investment adviser titled New Castle. 19 In sum, the SEC
civil action concerned Rajaratnam's alleged activities in purchasing
inside information regarding a dozen corporations from individuals
placed within Intel Corporation, IBM, McKinsey & Company (a global
consulting firm; "McKinsey"), and other companies. 20 Rajaratnam was
said to have gleaned over $33 million in profits from trading between
2006 and 2009 based upon the wrongfully obtained information.2 ' The
allegedly "tipped," nonpublic information concerned events ranging
from corporate takeovers to imminent earnings reports, and the tips
occasionally traveled through multiple parties. 2
The two claims of the 2009 SEC Complaint sought relief based
upon alleged violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") 23 (and Rule 1Ob-5 24 promulgated
thereunder) and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the
"Securities Act").2 5 Rajaratnam and others were alleged to have violated
all three subsections of Rule lOb-5; overall, Rajaratnam, was found to
have acted illegally in three capacities-as a misappropriator (for having
allegedly misappropriated material, nonpublic information via Galleon's
representation on a board of directors), as a tippee (for utilizing
improperly tipped information imparted by others for cash), and as a
tipper (for, in turn, tipping illegally obtained information to the Galleon
Funds).26 On this last score, Rajaratnam and others were said to be
"liable for the trading occurring in the funds advised-directly or
indirectly-by each, respectively, because each effectuated the trades on
18. 2009 SEC Complaint, supra note 16, at 2-6.
19. Id.at 2, 8.
20. Id.at 2.
21. See generally 2009 SEC Complaint, supra note 16.
22. Id.at 2. The following is a sample allegation: "A Polycom, Inc. ('Polycom') senior
executive tipped Khan to material nonpublic information about Polycom's Fourth Quarter... 2005
and ...2006 earnings. Khan traded based on that information and, in turn, tipped Rajaratnam, who
traded on behalf of Galleon based on that information." Id. at 3.
23. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
24. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). Rule lOb-5's three subsections address, in turn, fraudulent
schemes, misstatements, and practices. Id. The nearly seventy-year-old rule is the mechanism by
which varied and novel forms of fraud are punished by regulators. LARRY D. SODERQUIST &
THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES REGULATION 424 (7th ed. 2010) ("The Commission adopted

Rule lOb-5 in 1942 to close a gap in the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws.").
25. Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). For many
years, securities fraud has been charged by the Commission simultaneously under both Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act. See In re Lebed, Securities Act
Release Nos. 33-7891, 34-43307, 73 SEC Docket 741, 742 (Sept. 20, 2000).
26. 2009 SEC Complaint, supranote 16, at 45-48.
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behalf of the funds, controlled the funds and/or unlawfully tipped the
inside information to the funds. 27
Separately, the U.S. Attorney's 2009 indictment of Rajaratnam (the
"Indictment")-unsealed the same day as the SEC announced its civil
charges2-joined just one other defendant, Chiesi. 29 The Indictment
detailed seven conspiracies between 2003 and 2009 involving
Rajaratnam and others (some unnamed) to obtain inside information for
purposes of profitable trading in public company stocks. 30 The
Indictment named ten stocks traded between 2006 and 2009, and sought
forfeiture by Chiesi and Rajaratnam of profits in excess of $20 million.31
In addition to alleging violations of all three subsections of Rule lOb-5,

27. Id. at 47. On October 26, 2011, the SEC filed a new civil complaint ("October 2011
Complaint") naming Rajaratnam and Rajat Gupta, a former Director at McKinsey and a former
Board member of The Procter & Gamble Company ("P & G") and The Goldman Sachs Group
("Goldman Sachs"), as defendants. Complaint at 1, 20, SEC v. Gupta, No. 11 CIV 7566 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 26, 2011). The October 2011 Complaint alleges that, in September 2008, Gupta tipped
Rajaratnam material, nonpublic information concerning Goldman Sachs and P & G. Id. at 2. The
Galleon Funds allegedly traded on the basis of this information consequently generated over $23
million in profits. Id. Previously, Gupta defeated an attempt by the SEC to file an Order Instituting
Public Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings (that is, an administrative complaint)
against him, arguing that, by singling him out among the Galleon Defendants for internal SEC
proceedings, the Commission had violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 506-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Judge Jed S. Rakoffs
ruling against the SEC was again scathing: "A funny thing happened on the way to this forum. On
March 1, 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission.. .- having previously filed all of its
Galleon-related insider trading actions in this federal district-decided it preferred its home turf."
Id. at 506.
28. Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Disclosure of Wiretapped Conversations, N.Y. L.J.,
Dec. 8, 2010, at 3.
29. Indictment, United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15,
2009). Chiesi later pleaded guilty to three counts of securities fraud and received a sentence of thirty
months. Susan Pulliam & Chad Bray, Key Plotter Pleads Guilty in Galleon, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20,
2011, at Al; Scott Schifrel, Raj RajaratnamGalleon Probe: Danielle Chiesi Sentencedfor Insider
Trading, DAILY NEWS (July 20, 2011), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-07-20/news/
29814451_1 danielle-chiesi-mark-kurland-raj-rajaratnam-galleon. Several other of the Galleon
Defendants lost their criminal trials in 2011. See Grant McCool, Rajaratnam Wins Ruling, Wiretap
Turnover on Hold, REAL CLEAR MARKETS (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.realclearmarkets.com/news/
reuters/financebusiness/2011/Jan/20/rajaratnamwinsrulingwiretaptumover on hold.html.
30. See generally Indictment, supranote 29.
31. Id. at 34 (seeking forfeiture "of at least $20.8 million"). A superseding indictment brought
in February 2010 added charges against Rajaratnam and Chiesi based upon statements made during
guilty pleas of other defendants between January 7, 2010 and February 8, 2010. Press Release, U.S.
Attorney S. Dist. N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney Files Additional Charges Against Raj Rajaratnam
and Danielle Chiesi (Feb. 9, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/
Februaryl0/rajaratnametalslindictmentprpdf" In the main, the additional charges detailed allegedly
illegal trading in more companies, while also elaborating on Rajaratnam's "corrupt agreements"
with more defendants. Id. At trial, the government would allege illicit profits exceeding $72 million.
Mark Hamblett, 11-Year Term for Rajaratnam Falls Short of Government Wishes, N.Y. L.J., Oct.
14, 2011, at 1.
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the Indictment also alleged violations of Rule 10b5-2, 32 a more modem
prohibition self-explained as providing "a non-exclusive definition of
circumstances in which a person has a duty of trust or confidence for
purposes of the 'misappropriation' theory of insider trading. 33 Within
days of the Indictment, Galleon-which held approximately $3.7 billion
in assets-closed, and its investors began receiving redemptions of their
investments.34
B.

The Wiretap Battle

A key difference between the underlying SEC and DOJ
investigations lay in wiretaps, a tool routinely used by criminal
investigators.35 The DOJ received authority to tap Rajaratnam's phones
from March 2008 through October 2009;36 the SEC, which interviewed
the hedge fund titan on several occasions in the years 2007 to 2009, was
precluded by law from even knowing of the wiretaps' existence.37 As the
parallel matters proceeded towards separate trials, it became evident that
both the civil and criminal cases would rely in part on wiretapped
conversations, a first in the Commission's storied war on insider
trading.3 8 In a written decision from February 2010 ("Rakoff Order"),
District Court Judge Jed S. Rakoff, while acknowledging that the DOJ
and the Commission were "partner[s]" in the Galleon investigation,
noted that the two government units had not directly shared the wiretap
tapes. 39 Based upon a joint defense agreement between certain of the
Galleon Defendants (and the discovery rule codified in the Federal Rules

32. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2011); see generally Indictment, supra note 29.
33. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2.
34. Michael J. de la Merced & Zachery Kouwe, Galleon to Begin Winding Down Funds,
DEALBOOK (Oct. 21, 2009, 12:03 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/10/21/galleon-to-winddown-funds/.
35. See Packer, supranote 17, at 47-48.
36. Id. at 47.
37. Id. at 48.
38. Lattman, supra note 3 (noting the government's "novel ideas and hardball tactics").
However, the tactic of playing revealing audiotapes in Manhattan securities fraud trials is not
completely new. In 1989, then U.S. Attorney Rudolph Giuliani spearheaded a case that resulted in a
jury convicting five executives of the firm of Princeton/Newport Partners for stock manipulation;
the tapes, which were routinely kept on the trading desk of the defunct firm, provided colorful
banter highlighted by one trader's comment to another about entering "the world of. . . sleaze."
Welcome to the World of Sleaze, TIME, Aug. 14, 1989, at 52 (internal quotation marks omitted); A
Biography of Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/records/rwgihtml/
bio.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2012). On appeal, the convictions were vacated and a new trial
ordered. Convictions in the '80s, Reversals in the '90s, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 1991, at D2.
39. SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, 683 F. Supp. 316, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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of Civil Procedure 40 ), Judge Rakoff ordered the defendants who had
received copies of the tapes from the DOJ to, in turn, share the same
with the SEC.4 1 An immediate appeal of that ruling resulted in a
temporary stay of the order to defendants to turn over the tapes.42 The
Rakoff Order was subsequently vacated by a panel of the Second Circuit
on September 29, 2010, 43 striking the balance in favor of third parties:
While the SEC has a right of access to the wiretap materials, that right
must be balanced against the strong privacy interests at stake in
connection with the fruits of electronic surveillance. The privacy
interests in the instant case merit particular attention given that the
[Rakoff] disclosure order implicated thousands of conversations of
hundreds of innocent parties, and that the district court ordered
disclosure prior to any ruling on the legality of the interceptions and
without limiting the disclosure to relevant conversations.4
Finally, on November 24, 2010, Judge Richard J. Holwell decided that
the DOJ wiretaps had been lawfully obtained, freeing the evidence for
submission at the scheduled criminal trial of Rajaratnam and Chiesi.4 5
C. The Rejected/Resisted Requestsfor Stay
Separately, the Southern District of New York courts made their
mark on procedure in other ways. Although SEC civil cases are
traditionally stayed pending resolution of related criminal matters, 46
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
41. Galleon Mgmt., 683 F. Supp. at 318-19. See also Zachery Kouwe, Judge Orders Galleon
Defendants to Release Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, at B2. Judge Rakoff, a former Assistant
U.S. Attorney (and chief of its Business and Securities Fraud Prosecutions Unit) has in recent years
openly criticized SEC settlement practices. See Luke McGrath, JudicialProfile: Hon. Jed S. Rakoff
FED. LAW., June 2010, at 32, 32; Mark Hamblett, Judge Orders Hearing,Lays Out Questionsfor
SEC over Proposed Settlement with Citigroup Global, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 28, 2011, at I (noting Judge
Rakoff's initial rejection of a proposed settlement between the SEC and Bank of America in
September 2009); Mark Hamblett, Judge Spurns SEC-Citigroup Deal as Contrary to Interest in
Truth, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 29, 2011, at 1 (describing rejection of a proposed $285 million settlement as
"privately negotiated on the basis of unknown facts").
42. McCool, supra note 29.
43. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 188 (2d Cir. 2010). See also Galleon Founder Wins
Stay of Wiretaps in Civil Case, BREAKiNG LEGAL NEWS (Mar. 24, 2010, 10:09), http://www.
breakinglegatnews.com/entry/Galleon-founder-wins-stay-of-wiretaps-in-civil-case.
44. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d at 184.
45. Patricia Hurtado, SEC Seeks Wiretapsfrom Rajaratnamfor Civil Case After Judge Admits
Them, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 20, 2010, 3:02 PM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-1220/sec-seeks-wiretaps-from-rajaratnam-for-civil-case-afer-judge-admits-them.html.
46. See Donald A. Corbett & Elliott Z. Stein, The Perils of Partial Stays in Parallel
Proceedings, N.Y. L.J., May 7, 2010, at 4 ("Generally, in a parallel civil litigation where the
plaintiff is a government agency, courts are more likely to find that the defendant is burdened, and
are therefore more likely to stay the civil case.").
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Judge Rakoff refused to slavishly follow the pattern, initially setting the
trial date on the 2009 SEC Complaint for August 2010. 41 In September
2010, as the Second Circuit announced in vacating the Rakoff Order, the
SEC trial remained scheduled for February 2011.48 Meanwhile, the DOJ
took the initiative in announcing that the SEC would no longer
robotically stay its own actions in abeyance of a parallel criminal
proceeding. 49 And even after the lack of an adjournment had been loudly
chastised by the appellate court, Judge Rakoff, in June 2011, refused to
delay the start of the civil trial until after sentencing (which had been set
for August 201 1).5o
D. The Criminal Trial
Thus, amidst a resolved battle over the wiretaps and an unresolved
one about civil stays, the criminal trial against Rajaratnam commenced
in March 2011 in lower Manhattan. 51 The federal prosecutors were
described as very confident.52 The prosecution's case, which relied in
47. See Erin Geiger Smith, Summer SEC Trial for Raj Rajaratnam, BUS. INSIDER LAW
REvIEW (Nov. 4, 2009), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2009-11-04/law-review/29983912_1
trial- date-sec-complaint-hearing.
48. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d at 166-67, 188. The Second Circuit noted that the U.S. Attorney's
office had unsuccessfully "intervened and moved to adjourn the civil trial until after the completion
of the criminal trial." Id. at 166. The court's words were both direct in revealing sentiments and
telling in revealing triage strategies:
The more prudent course in the instant case may have been to adjourn the civil trial until
after the criminal trial. Apparently, all the parties agreed to such a request, yet the district
court declined to grant it. Were the civil trial adjourned, the most relevant wiretapped
conversations, assuming they were found to be legally intercepted, might well be
publicly disclosed at the criminal trial, and the SEC would then be able to use these
materials in a civil proceeding without implicating any weighty privacy rights. Such an
adjournment would have the added benefit of making the district court's job of balancing
any relevant interests significantly easier.
Id. at 186.
49. Bruce Carton, SEC Won't Always Stay Its Proceedingsfor DOJ Cases, COMPLIANCE WK.
(May 4, 2010), http://www.complianceweek.com/sec-wont-always-stay-its-proceedings-for-dojcases/article/188270/ (quoting a DOJ assistant attorney general as saying that "the days are gone
where the civil action will necessarily be stayed until the criminal action is over" (internal quotation
marks omitted)). A government spokeswoman later added that the statement had been made in
response to cases in which courts had "elected not to put SEC civil cases on hold." Id (internal
quotation marks omitted).
50. Order at 3, SEC v. Galleon Mgrnt., LP, 2011 WL 5374112 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2011) (No.
09 Civ. 8811 (JSR)) (order refusing to move trial date from August 22, 2011). See Ian Thomas,
Judge Won't Delay Civil Case for Rajaratnam Sentence, LAW360 (June 6, 2011, 5:06 PM ET),
http://www.law360.com/newyork/articles/249593 (noting that the SEC asked for the delay to adjust
its disgorgement request based upon the monetary sanction (if any) to be announced at Rajaratnam's
sentencing).
51. Packer, supranote 17, at 51.
52. Katie Benner, Welcome to the Raj RajaratnamShow, CNN MONEY (Mar. 9, 2011, 9:49
AM ET), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2011/03/09/welcome-to-the-raj-rajaratnam-show/ (noting
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large part on cooperating co-defendants, alleged that sixteen insiders
were part of various conspiracies generating nearly $64 million in profits
and victimizing at least nineteen public companies.53 On the first day of
trial, Anil Kumar, the prosecution's lead witness, took the stand.
Kumar-Rajaratnam's source, an investor with Galleon, and a director at
McKinsey-testified
clearly to trading confidential information for cash
54
from Raj aratnam.
Subsequently, the prosecutors played forty-six wiretap tapes for the
jury, who heard Kumar reduce the economic crisis to his inability "to get
the percentage" on a trade, and a Galleon employee advising Chiesi to
"trade around [a] position" to avoid detection by the SEC.55 Rajaratnam
did not take the stand, and his defense centered on the testimony of a
finance professor that the importance of the obtained inside information
was minimized by the amount of publicly available information in the
marketplace. 6 Additionally, the defense offered the testimony of
Galleon's head of research and an array of public reports and articles to
portray the defendant as a diligent student of the market.5 7
In summation, the prosecutor belittled diversionary tactics by the
defense, which was characterized as asking the jury to "ignore logic,
forget reality and suspend common sense." 58 In turn, the defense, in
that "19 people [had] already pled guilty in the vast, ongoing insider trading bust" and quoting an
attorney for a former Galleon employee as being "surprised" that his client's testimony was deemed
unnecessary, concluding that the government "must be very confident" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
53. Hamblett, supra note 31, at 6; Packer, supra note 17, at 51.
54. Packer, supra note 17, at 51-52. The exchange between the prosecutor and Kumar was
hauntingly confessing:
PROSECUTOR: "At the very beginning,.., you thought he was asking for legitimate
information?"
KUMAR: "Yes, sir."
PROSECUTOR: "And, once he started paying you, he was asking you for confidential
information?"
KUMAR: "That's correct, sir."
PROSECUTOR: "And, once he was paying you, you started giving it to him?"
KUMAR: "Yes, that is correct, sir. To my eternal regret."
1d. at 52 (internal quotation marks omitted). Kumar was paid $2.1 million by Rajaratnam for
information. Id. at 51. Other co-conspirators confessed via their entries of pleas; one of the last
to do so was Chiesi, who admitted to bringing "disrepute to what is an honorable profession."
Id.
55. Id. at 53, 55.
56. Id. at 53; Peter J. Henning, Don't Fight the Wiretaps, DEALBOOK (June 21, 2011, 3:27
PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/2 l/dont-fight-the-wiretaps/.
57. Azam Ahmed, Defense in Insider Trial Seeks to Present Galleon as Disciplined,
DEALBOOK (Apr. 11,2011, 9:15 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.eom/2011/04/1 l/rajaratnam-lawyersopen-defense/.
58. Azam Ahmed & Peter Lattman, Jury DeliberationBeings at Insider Trading Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2011, at B2.
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effect, argued that a surplus of information in and about the modem
marketplace prevented information from ever being secret.5 9 The judge's
ensuing jury instructions were said to have been thorough, providing
"lengthy legal definitions for everything from reasonable doubt to
conspiracy. 60 On the question of what degree of reliance on the inside
information need be shown, the judge's instructions told the jury that it
would need to be "persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that material
nonpublic information given to the defendant was a factor, however
small, in the defendant's decision to purchase or sell stock."61
Approximately eight weeks after commencing, the criminal trial
went to the jury in late April 2011.62 After twelve days of deliberations,
Rajaratnam was found guilty of all fourteen counts.63 The court then
entertained rival sentencing memoranda, which-perhaps predictablycentered on the dangers posed by insider trading. 64 While the Sentencing
Recommendation recommended a fifteen-year sentence, 65 prosecutors
sought a criminal sentence in the range of nineteen and a half to twentyfour and a half years, citing the "significant danger that these executives
and money managers may view a light sentence as an insufficient
deterrent to insider trading., 66 Conversely, the defense argued in favor of
a range under three years, commensurate with the sentences meted out to
several co-conspirators who had entered guilty pleas. 67 The defense's
filing attempted to distinguish the insider trader from the blatant thief,
arguing that "a defendant tippee who profits from illegal trading does not
engage in conduct that is as culpable as a defendant who affirmatively
' 68
steals the same amount from an identifiable victim.
On October 13, 2011, the trial judge sentenced Rajaratnam to
eleven years in prison-a term the press noted was "substantially below
the range recommended by the federal guidelines, 69 (as well as the range

59. Packer, supra note 17, at 52.
60. Ahmed & Lattman, supra note 58.
61. Charge to the Jury at 49, United States v. Rajaratnam, No. S2 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH)
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2011).
62. Peter J. Henning, The Crucial Question for the RajaratnamJury, DEALBOOK (Apr. 25,
2011, 10:05 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/the-key-question-for-the-rajaratnarnjury/.
63. Packer, supranote 17, at 54.
64. See Henning, supranote 3.
65. Sentencing Recommendation at 57, United States v. Rajaratnam, No. S2 09 CR 1184-01
(RJH) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2011).
66. Henning, supranote 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Id.
68. Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Peter J. Henning, The Road Ahead for Raj Rajaratnam, DEALBOOK (Oct. 14, 2011, 8:22
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011 /10/14/the-road-ahead-for-raj-rajaratnam/.
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requested by the prosecution). 70 The judge concurrently imposed fines
and restitution exceeding $63 million.7 1 While noting the defendant's ill
health, the jurist stated, "[i]nsider trading is an assault on the free
markets. 72 The U.S. Attorney declared, "[w]e can only hope that this
case will be the wake-up call we said it should be when Mr. Rajaratnam
was arrested., 73 The defense was said to be considering an appeal based
upon the government's applications for the wiretaps (and their ensuing
use at trial).74
E. Epilogue?
Meanwhile, the SEC trial remained set for December 5, 2011.75 In
October 2011, Judge Rakoff received a motion from the Commission
seeking partial summary judgment ("Summary Judgment Motion") on
the issue of Rajaratnam's culpability in trading on inside information in
five stocks that formed part of the proof of the criminal trial.76 The
Summary Judgment Motion requested that, in addition to the forfeiture
and fine ordered in the criminal sentencing, Rajaratnam pay a
disgorgement of $41.3 million and, pursuant to Section 21A of the
Exchange Act, a civil fine exceeding $90 million. 77 In opposing the
motion, Rajaratnam did not contest liability (or the imposition of an SEC
injunction); however, he argued that his criminal forfeiture offset any
civil disgorgement, and that the fine sought by the Commission was
"exorbitant" in light of his eleven-year prison sentence.78

70. Lattman, supranote 3.
71. Id.
72. Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Grant McCool, RajaratnamGets 11-Year Prison Sentence, REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2011, 7:09
PM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/13/us-galleon-rajaratnam-idUSTRE79COMC2O
111013?i=4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Henning, supra note 56.
75. Order at 2, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, No. 09 Civ. 8811 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2011)
(order setting forth the schedule for further proceedings).
76. Rajaratnam Opposes SEC Bid for Penalties over and Above Sanctions in Criminal Case,
43 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2156 (Oct. 24, 2011). The SEC had sought partial summary
judgment on the claims in the 2009 Complaint based upon trades in five securities noted in both the
civil and criminal charges. Id. In response, Rajaratnam argued that he had been "adequately
punished" by the sanctions imposed at the end of the criminal trial. Id.(internal quotation marks
omitted). Concurrently, the corporate defendant Galleon-which was represented by separate
counsel-argued against the motion, alleging that, because it was not a party to the criminal case, it
was not subject to collateral estoppel. Id.
77. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21A(a)(l)-(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a)(l)-(2) (2006);
RajaratnamOpposes SEC Bidfor Penaltiesover and Above Sanctions in Criminal Case, supra note
76, at 2156.
78. Id. ("In light of all the factors Judge [Richard Holwell of the criminal court] carefully
considered, and the substantial penalty he imposed, Mr. Rajaratnam submits that no further
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On November 8, 2011, Judge Rakoff issued a brief decision
imposing a civil fine of $92,805,705 against Rajaratnam. 79 The opinion
and order, while avoiding discussion of double jeopardy concerns,
explained the court's authority to impose the maximum penalty
permitted under Section 21A, as demonstrated by Second Circuit case
law. 80 Noting that the SEC had dropped its request for disgorgement in
light of the criminal forfeiture, Judge Rakoff commented that the
defendant's positions "misapprehend[ed] both the nature of this parallel
In tersely
proceeding and the purpose[] of civil penalties.'
as
aspect[]"
a
"monetary
characterizing criminal sentences with
"designed to compensate victims and deprive the defendant of his illgotten gains," the jurist described SEC penalties as ensuring that the
violator pays "'severely in monetary terms."'' 82 In early December 2011,
the court announcing his intention to
Rajaratnam filed a notice with
83
appeal the SEC's civil penalty.
As 2011 concluded, government enforcement efforts seemingly
remained focused on white collar insider trading, particularly, attorney
defendants 84 and hedge fund advisers. 85 Rajaratnam had lost his bid to
avoid double penalties from the government.86 Separately, Rajav Gupta,
a friend and source to Rajaratnam, was alleged to have tipped
Rajaratnam on at least one stock and was named in both SEC and
criminal charges on October 26, 2011.87 This SEC complaint joined

punishment or penalty is warranted." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
79. SEC v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Civ. 8811(JSR), 2011 WL 5374112, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8,
2011).
80. Id. at *1-2.
81. Id.
82. Id.at *2. Judge Rakoffadded that "this case cries out for the kind of civil penalty that will
deprive this defendant of a material part of his fortune." Id.
83. Chad Bray, RajaratnamMay Appeal Record SEC Penalty, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Dec. 7,
2011, 3:43 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/12/07/rajaratnam-may-appeal-record-sec-penalty/.
84. See, e.g., Two Attorneys Settle SEC Insider Trading Charges, 43 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 2160 (Oct. 24, 2011).
85. Benton Campbell & Maria Barton, SEC Targets FundAdvisors, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 7, 2011,
at 9 (detailing the work of the Commission's Asset Management Unit as "the largest of five
specialized units created during the [Division of Enforcement's] recent restructuring"); Peter
Lattman, New Round of Insider Trading Charges Is Expected, DEALBOOK (Nov. 30, 2011, 11:32
PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/new-round-of-insider-trading-charges-expected/
(disclosing the "expected" charges resulting from FBI raids of two hedge funds in 2010).
86. See Rajaratnam Opposes SEC Bid for Penalties over and Above Sanctions in Criminal
Case, supra note 76, at 2156.
87. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Files Insider Trading Charges Against
Rajat Gupta (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-223.htm. The more recent
SEC Complaint focuses on alleged tips from Gupta concerning the stock of Goldman Sachs. Id. This
case is set for trial in the Southern District of New York in May 2012. See Patricia Hurtado, Gupta
Wasn't Rajaratnam's Only Goldman 'Insider,' US. Says, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 8, 2012),
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Rajaratnam as a defendant, marking the fourth government charging
instrument against the hedge fund king within two years.8 8
On November 30, 2011, Rajaratnam asked the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit to reverse a prior denial of bail and free
him until the appeal of the criminal trial verdict.8 9 The defendant argued
that the government's request for the wiretaps misled the approving
judge, thus rendering the tapes inadmissible at Rajaratnam's trial. 90 One
day later, the Second Circuit denied the request via a one-line opinion;
Rajaratnam's appeal of his conviction in the criminal trial is set for
2012.91
III.

WHAT HAS

CHANGED, PROCEDURALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY

On the surface, the Rajaratnam conviction presents an immediate
change to securities fraud detection and punishment. To be sure, the use
of criminal investigative tactics in an insider trading case dramatically
heightens the crime and its pursuit. 92 Likewise, the eleven-year sentence
punctuates a period of unprecedented incarceration: since 2009, the
federal courts in New York have sent convicted insider traders to jail
seventy-nine percent of the time (up from fifty-nine percent in the 2000s,
and somewhere under fifty percent in the decade before).93 Likewise, the
median sentence for those so incarcerated has risen to approximately two
and a half years (as opposed to eighteen months in94 the prior decade and
eleven and a half months between 1993 and 1999).
But the SEC's proclivity towards deputizing the deputies raises a
host of problems. The conflicts posed by the indirect sharing of evidence
(and headline-grabbing partitioning of results) may forestall certainty in
both enforcement theory and individual outcomes. Witness the words of
Judge Rakoff's Order of February 2010:
More broadly, the notion that only one party to a litigation should have
access to some of the most important non-privileged evidence bearing
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-07/ex-goldman-sachs-director-gupta-s-trial-set-for-mayafter-new-arraignment.html.
88. Id. Rajaratnam's participation in this additional SEC case was effectively ended via his
settlement with the Commission in November 2011. See supranote 79 and accompanying text.
89. Mark Hamblett, Rajaratnam to Begin Prison Sentence on Monday, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 2,
2011, at 1.
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. See Brotman & Dougherty, supranote 12, at 16-19.
93.

Chad Bray & Rob Barry, Long Jail Terms on Rise: Inside Trades Draw Lengthier

Sentences, Analysis Finds; RajaratnamPenalty Today, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2011, at C1 (noting
the findings of a Wall Street Journalanalysis).
94.

Id.
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directly on the case runs counter to basic principles of civil discovery
in an adversary system and therefore should not readily be inferred, at
least not when the party otherwise left in ignorance is a government
agency charged with civilly enforcing the very same provisions that are
the subject 95of the parallel criminal cases arising from the same
transactions.

Overall, in terms of both procedure and substantive law, the fights on all
96
fronts are bound to have precedential consequences.
A.

On CriminalReferrals andProcedure...

Concerning SEC referrals to other authorities, practitioners and
commentators alike have grappled with the threshold for "criminal"
securities fraud. While Section 21(d) of the Exchange Act clearly
contemplates referrals from the Commission to the DOJ,97 the factors
prompting such referral have, at best, been kept vague and, at worst,
been subject to public perceptions and attendant pressures.98 Moreover,
the typical SEC civil case enjoys such luxuries as a lower pleading
burden, 99 near freedom from statutes of limitations ("SOL"),'00 and
95. SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, 683 F. Supp. 2d 316, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
96. See Peter Lattman, Insider Case May Consult President of Goldman, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
19, 2011, at B6 (noting that, at a court hearing the day before, lawyers for one of Rajaratnam's
alleged tippers and federal prosecutors "debated the timing of depositions that are set to be taken in
a parallel [SEC] civil case").
97. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (2006) ("The
Commission may transmit such evidence as may be available concerning such acts or practices as
may constitute a violation of any provision of this chapter or the rules or regulations thereunder to
the Attorney General, who may, in his discretion, institute the necessary criminal proceedings under
this chapter.").
98. See Douglas Rappaport et al., When Is Insider Trading Subject to Criminal Prosecution?,
N.Y. L.J., July 7, 2008, at 10.
99. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 95-96 (1981) (setting forth a preponderance of the
evidence standard of proof).
100. The securities laws are silent on the applicability of any SOL to SEC enforcement actions.
JAMEs D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 609 (6th ed. 2009).
Concurrently, the traditional view is that the defense of laches "is not available in either SEC
enforcement actions or government criminal actions." Id. at 802. In 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court
applied a statutory one year SOL from the date of discovery/three year maximum SOL governing
private actions based upon misleading initial public offering registration materials. Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 353-55, 364 (1991) (applying the express
provisions of § 13 of the Securities Act). That construct was extended to two years/five years in
2002 by Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for actions alleging "fraud." Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 804, 116 Stat. 801 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2006)). In recent
years, a number of federal courts have ruled that the generic SOL holding governmental actions for
fines and penalties to five years applies to SEC actions seeking civil fines, but not to SEC actions
seeking disgorgement or rescission. See, e.g., SEC v. Jones, 476 F. Supp. 2d 374, 380-83, 385
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (dismissing the Commission's claim for civil penalties as time barred by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2462).
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limitless references to the accused's assertion of the Fifth Amendment
privilege from self-incrimination.'0 °
Additionally, the furthering of insider trading case law through
criminal actions is of marginal value to future SEC actions. It is
axiomatic that the use of such criminal precedent poses new pleading
obstacles to the SEC. First and foremost, it is not inconceivable that a
future defendant facing parallel civil and criminal actions will
10 2
successfully invoke the U.S. Constitution's double jeopardy clause.
Between 1989 and 1997, there loomed the specter that a civil action
brought by the government could seek penalties so punitive and/or
redundant as to constitute an impermissible criminal action. 10 3 Pursuant
to this view under United States v. Halper,1°4 the SEC ran the risk of its
fines imposed after criminal convictions being evaluated for
constitutionality.'05 The concern was more than just theoretical.0 6
Subsequently, in Hudson v. United States,10 7 the U.S. Supreme
Court modified the standard to preclude only truly "criminal" subsequent
punishment, while encouraging an analysis that deferred to
congressional labeling of a penalty as civil in nature. 1 8 Hudson further
educated that such statutory analysis involves a two-part scrutiny of, in
turn, (1) whether the effecting legislature "indicated either expressly or
impliedly a preference for one label or the other," and (2) "whether the
statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect."' 0 9 The
Hudson Court added that, in determining whether a civil penalty could
101. See Audrey Strauss, Recent Insider Trading Jury Charges: 'Possession' vs. 'Use,' N.Y.
L.J., July 7, 2011, at 5, 7 (noting the Commission's entitlement to "an adverse inference from the
defendants' invocation of Fifth Amendment rights").
102. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449-50, 454 (1989) (finding that imposed
fines bore no "rational relation" to the harm caused by the defendant and thus constituted a second
criminal sanction).
104. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
105. See Matthew Scott Morris, Comment, The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny
Stock Reform Act of 1990: By Keeping Up with the Joneses, the SEC's Enforcement Arsenal is
Modernized, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 151, 182 (1993) (citations omitted) (noting that "punitive
monetary penalties only raise double jeopardy concerns when multiple sanctions are consecutively
levied for a single securities infraction").
106. See, e.g., United States v. Stoller, 78 F.3d 710, 713, 724 (lst Cir. 1996) (evaluating a
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation debarment proceeding against a bank CEO and holding that
it did not violate double jeopardy because the agency action was "predominantly remedial in
nature").
107. 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
108. Id at 102-04.
109. Id.at 99 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,
248-49 (1980); Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956)). The Hudson Court
detailed seven "useful guideposts" for part two of the analysis. Id. at 99-100 (citing Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)).
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be declared criminal, only the "clearest proof [would] suffice."" In
essence, Hudson replaced the "overwhelmingly disproportionate"
analysis of Halperwith one of statutory intent."'
Shortly thereafter, the SEC benefitted from the Second Circuit's
SEC v. Palmisano12 decision, which-specifically regarding Section
21A13-upheld the imposition of a $9.2 million disgorgement and a
$500,000 civil fine following a criminal conviction (wherein
the
14
defendant had been ordered to pay unspecified restitution).'
But the Commission, by openly seeking disgorgement and the
statutory maximum in civil fines against Rajaratnam, perhaps pressed its
luck. Post-conviction, but on the eve of civil trial, Rajaratnam asked the
court to preclude such a penalty on double jeopardy grounds. 115 He
failed, both in getting the SEC fine reduced and in prompting Judge
Rakoff to undertake a double jeopardy analysis in his decision. 1 6 While
the ruling of Judge Rakoff may simply reiterate the Second Circuit's
support for evaluating a broad array of factors in imposing maximum
treble fines under Section 21A," 17 the jurist refused to even entertain the
notion that the SEC fine--coming on the immediate heels of the criminal
action--could be seen as excessive. 18
For now the result is clear. In the Second Circuit, the SEC need not
fear anything more than supportive analysis of its civil fines, regardless
of the second level of scrutiny suggested by Hudson. Moreover, if Judge
Rakoff's summary judgment ruling is any indication, ancillary
considerations such as the reduction of an SEC monetary fine linked to
the closing of the defendant's business" 9 and the argument that tippees
110. Id. at 100 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249) (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. See id.
at 100-05 (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. 135 F.3d 860 (2d Cir. 1998).
113. Section 21A permits the SEC to seek a fine up to three times the profit gained/loss
avoided by the insider trader as "determined by the court in light of the facts and circumstances."
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21A(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a)(3) (2006).
114. Palmisano, 135 F.3d at 863,867.
115. See Rajaratnam Opposes SEC Bid for Penalties Over and Above Sanctions in Criminal
Case, supra note 76, at 2156 (describing Rajaratnam's response to the SEC's October 2011 motion
for partial summary judgment, which calculated the potential monies sought by the SEC fines as
topping $94 million).
116. See SEC v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Civ. 881 1(JSR), 2011 WL 5374112, at *1, *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 8, 2011).
117. See, e.g., SEC v. Blue Bottle Ltd., No. 07-CV-1380 (CSH) ESF, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
95992, at *21-22 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2007) ("The elements to consider in determining the penalty
include, among other things, a defendant's culpability, the amount of profits gained, and the
repetitive nature of the unlawful act and the deterrent effect of a penalty given the defendant's net
worth.").
118. See generally Rajaratnam,No. 09 Civ. 8811(JSR), 2011 WL 5374112.
119. See SEC v. Pardue, 367 F. Supp. 2d 773, 776-78 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (denying the injunction
requested by the Commission and lowering its monetary penalty).
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warrant less discipline than those who steal the inside information 20 will
not garner much attention in the Second Circuit.
Practically speaking, future reliance on wiretaps, other DOJ tools,
or DOJ partnering in general presages certain appeals and uncertain
rulings. Complicating matters in the Rajaratnam case is the fact that,
while a circuit court may soon receive an appeal, a healthy dose of the
content and tenor of the Galleon wiretap evidence has already been made
public.1 21 Indeed, the imminent legal battles over the use of third party
tapes in insider trading trials is at oddly hypothetical yet strangely
mooted by the perceptions already solidified.
Strategically, the Rajaratnam case represents a potentially
dangerous view that incarceration generally deters insider trading; the
persistence of the crime in the wake of thirty years of criminal trials
proves otherwise.122 Despite his successes in the Galleon cases, the U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of New York earlier this year asked
the U.S. Sentencing Commission for an even higher sentencing range for
insider trading. 23 Undoubtedly, prosecutors and jurists alike seem to
now more than ever be confident that indictments will affect the storied
124
risk-benefit analysis attending aggressive decisions on Wall Street.
The federal judge who imposed sentence on Rajaratnam went so far to
state that "[h]is crimes
reflect a virus in our business culture that needs
' 25
to be eradicated."'

120. See SEC v. Grossman [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,518, at
97,527-28 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 1997), aff'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. SEC v. Hirshberg, 173
F.3d 846 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting the SEC contention that a tippee has a high degree of culpability).
121. See McCool, supra note 73. The McCool article discloses a taped July 2008 conversation
between Chiesi and Rajaratnam on a company's earnings report as follows: "They're gonna guide
down,.... I just got a call from my guy. I played him like a finely tuned piano." Id (internal
quotation marks omitted). Separately, the appellate court hearing the appeal of the Rakoff Order
noted that the U.S. Attorney's Office "inadvertently provided the SEC with a small group of wiretap
recordings that were later retracted." SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 165 n.1 (2d Cir. 2010).
Moreover, the U.S. Attorney released select excerpts of conversations prior to the criminal trial.
SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, 683 F. Supp. 2d 316, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that the wiretaps had
"already [been] partially disclosed publicly").
122. The first cases seeking to criminally charge insider trading by corporate "outsiders" can be
said to have appeared in the 1970s. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224-25
(1980) (reversing the 1978 conviction of a printer-not employed by any of the companies whose
stocks had been traded-who had profited from discerning the names of anonymous takeover
targets described in customer documents); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1981)
(upholding the indictment of a tipped investment banker who had learned of takeovers from
investment banking firm employees). Notably, in the Chiarellacase, the defendant similarly faced
multiple government actions. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 224-25.
123. Bray & Barry, supra note 93, at C2.
124. See id.; supranotes 92-94, 122-23 and accompanying text.
125. Lattman, supranote 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Nonetheless, the SEC has readily embraced burgeoning criminal
investigation. As the head of the Commission's Division of Enforcement
proclaimed in response to a question on the financial crisis (and long
before the Rajaratnam conviction): "we are enhancing our historically
close working relationship with other law enforcement authorities,
including the DOJ, in order to maximize the efficient use of limited
resources, as well as to deliver a united and forceful
response to those
126
who would violate the federal securities laws.'
The SEC has not only acknowledged the need to refer
investigations to other authorities but also has begun to take credit for
the transition. 127 Instead of freeing SEC resources, the more immediate
result of civil and criminal government agencies sharing evidence may
be duplication of efforts (and litigation). As has been aptly noted, the
Rajaratnam criminal trial served as a dress rehearsal for the regulators
tasked with demystifying the world of information sharing in a market
now tracked in milliseconds. 128 While the unqualified success of the U.S.
Attorney's case-in addition to making public a healthy selection of
wiretap evidence-showed that juries can be made to appreciate the
cloak and dagger world of modem insider trading, the greatest
consequence has been more insider trading trials. Notably, within a
month of Rajaratnam's sentencing,129new SEC charges were filed against
him and one of his alleged tippers.
Likewise, while criminal enforcement of the securities laws may
seem provocative, a world of alternatives exists for the deterrence of
insider trading. For better or for worse, insider trading actions
traditionally stemmed from stock exchange inquiries.130 Best situated to
monitor their own trading, the exchanges still provide the most reliable
real-time surveillance of the daily domestic trading activity of listed
126.

Mortgage Fraud, Securities Fraud, and the Financial Meltdown: Prosecuting Those

Responsible: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111 th Cong. 85-86 (2009) (testimony
of Robert Khuzami, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission).
127. U.S. SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N, FY 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 5152 (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2OlO.pdf (describing 492 referrals of
matters "more appropriately handled by another entity or in another venue," including 139 matters
referred to (unspecified) criminal authorities). Prior year data was not available for either of these
statistics.
128. See David Glovin, Rajaratnam Trial Offers U.S. Chance to 'Test Drive' Gupta Insider

Evidence, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 8, 2011, 8:30 PM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0309/rajaratnam-trial-offers-u-s-chance-to-test-drive-gupta-insider-evidence.htm
(quoting an SEC
official as describing the criminal trial against Rajaratnam, a tippee, as "'the flip side' of a future
civil case against Gupta, a tipper).
129. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 87.
130. See generally Overview, NYSE EURONEXT, http://usequities.nyx.com/regulation/nyseregulation/overview (last visited Apr. 20, 2012) (supplying an overview of the operations of the
NYSE Regulation corporation, including monitoring of trading activity).
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stocks. 13 ' More importantly, such exchanges have consistently
disciplined participants (both large and small) based upon an array of
violations stemming from insider trading. 132 While exchange-based
discipline is limited to member firms and their employees, the SEC
enjoys boundless jurisdiction which was actually blessed with the
allocation of stronger penalties under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the "Dodd-Frank Act"). 33 In
short, in light of the complications of time and procedure, and the
dubious value in concurrent penalties, there are alternatives available to
the SEC before partnering with the DOJ.
B. On Insider Trading Law Itself...
An interesting side note to the Rajaratnam case centers on SEC
advances in pleading liberality in recent years. Specifically, Rule lOb5-I
permits the SEC-in civil actions-to plead that a defendant traded
"while aware of' inside information. 34 This seemingly harmless
semantic string was actually the deliberate attempt by the Commission
about a decade ago to sidestep problems at trial occasioned by the
requirement that SEC attorneys distinguish between "use" and
"possession" of illegally obtained information.' While commentators
have noted the possible constitutional challenge to the use of
Rule 10b5-1 in criminal cases (in that it obligates the defendant to
prove-in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendmentthat he did not use the information of which he was aware), 136 a possible
more immediate ramification is abandonment of the SEC-friendly

131. See id.(noting the storied marketplace's "limited real-time monitoring of trading activity
on the facilities of the U.S. securities exchanges").
132. See, e.g., Decision at 1, 11, Dep't of Enforcement v. Braff, Complaint No.
2007011937001 (FINRA May 13, 2011) (noting that NASD Rule 3050(c) "acts to prevent insider
trading through its notification requirements"); NYSE, Inc., Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 8950, at 10 (June 5, 1989), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/89-050.pdf (accepting a Stipulation
of Facts and Consent to Penalty).
133. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 925, 124 Stat. 1376, 1850 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(6)(A), 78o-4(c)(4),
78q-l(c)(4)(C), 80b-3(f) (Supp. IV 2011)) (expanding SEC powers to suspend/bar officers and
directors charged under a provision relating to one type of investment entity from associating with
an entity targeted by another provision).
134. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act
Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,319, at 83,676 (Aug. 15, 2000).
135.

See RALPH C. FERRARA, ET AL., FERRARA ON INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL

§ 2.01[5], at 2-24 (2011) (describing the rule as "intended to resolve the [use vs. possession] debate
once and for all").
136. See id. § 2.01[5], at 2-24.15.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2011

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 40:411

provision altogether in light of the varying policies of the SEC regional
offices. 137
The larger effect of the criminal trial of Rajaratnam still may be
upon the pivotal choice of insider trading theory itself. The sources of
Rajaratnam's inside information often displayed a singular position:
employee of a public company, the stock of which Galleon sought to
exploit.13 8 As such, these individuals were classic "insiders" under
securities law.1 39 As insider theory has existed since 1980:
Under the "traditional" or "classical theory" of insider trading
liability, § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are violated when a corporate insider
trades in the securities of his corporation on the basis of material,
nonpublic information. Trading on such information qualifies as a
"deceptive device" under § 10b, we have affirmed, because "a
relationship of trust and confidence [exists] between the shareholders
of a corporation and those insiders who have obtained confidential
140
information by reason of their position with that corporation."
Concomitantly, the SEC has consistently charged corporate insiders
as having a duty to their shareholders that is breached upon the use of
confidential information for personal trading gain (that is, the Rule 1Ob-5
violation for such party does require a "theft" of the corporate
information). 141 Yet, the U.S. Attorney's indictments charged the
information under the
sources of Rajaratnam's
corporate
137. Compare Complaint at 14-15, SEC v. Stewart, No. 03 CV 4070 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2003)
(pleading merely Stewart's possession of inside information at the time of her sales), with 2009 SEC
Complaint, supra note 16, at 15-45 (pleading the defendants' actual use of the inside information).
At least one commentator has explained the disparate pleading as evidencing an evolving
government policy of pleading the higher standard. Strauss, supranote 101, at 7.
138. 2009 SEC Complaint, supranote 16, at 3-6; Lattman, supranote 3.
139. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (declaring Board
members, officers, and employees to be insiders for purposes of Rule IOb-5).
140. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997) (quoting Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980)).
141. In SEC v. Peterson,the SEC charged that:
Clayton Peterson learned the material nonpublic information that he conveyed to Drew
Peterson as a result of his service on the board of directors of Mariner [Energy, Inc.], and
Clayton Peterson knew, recklessly disregarded, or should have known, that he owed a
fiduciary duty, or obligation arising from a similar relationship of trust and confidence,
to keep the information confidential.
Amended Complaint at 11, SEC v. Peterson, No. 11 Civ. 5448 (RPP) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2011). The
SEC further noted in SEC v. Waksal that:
At the time of the transactions and events alleged in this Complaint, Waksal was
ImClone's CEO, and therefore owed a fiduciary duty to ImClone and its shareholders.
As a result, Waksal had a fiduciary duty, among other things, not to trade while in
possession of material non-public information and to keep material non-public
information confidential.
Amended Complaint at 4, SEC v. Waksal, No. 02 Civ. 4407 (NRB) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2003).
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misappropriation theory. 142 This, in effect charged them
with theft from
143
prove.
to
difficult
more
is
which
company,
own
their
In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court blessed the "misappropriation
theory," the mechanism by which Rule 1Ob-5 is applied to individuals
outside of the subject corporation who trade on inside information.'" In
crafting the decision that still largely defines the crime, Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg stated the following: "[i]n lieu of premising liability on
a fiduciary relationship between company insider and purchaser or seller
of the company's stock, the misappropriation theory premises liability on
a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception
of those who entrusted him with
145
information."'
confidential
to
access
The difference between the theories is more than just ease of proof.
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (the "Guidelines") 4 6 classify the
defendant guilty of "classic" (that is, subject company employee) insider
trading under "abuse[] ... of [a] special trust" and impose higher
penalties. 147 Stated otherwise, a source of inside information labeled a
misappropriator may receive a lesser penalty under the Guidelines when
not a member of corporate management. 148
V.

CONCLUSION

"In the end, the doctors were all in accord. They agreed they had no
idea what was wrong with the soldier who saw everything twice, and
they rolled him away into a room in the corridor
and quarantined
149
everyone else in the wardforfourteen days."'

142. Indictment, supra note 29, at 4. For example, in describing the acts of "[t]he [Ali] Far
Inside Sources," as the Indictment labels them, individuals employed by public companies are said
to have "misappropriated [i]nside [i]nformation in violation of... duties ... owed to their
respective employers and their shareholders." Id.
143. Simply put, whereas classic theory begins with recognition of a duty between corporate
employees and corporate shareholders, misappropriation theory must search for a commensurate
obligation, at times failing at the task. See, e.g., SEC v. Talbot, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1061 (C.D.
Cal. 2006) (finding no duty by an outside director to keep confidential news of an imminent
acquisition involving third parties), rev'd, 530 F.3d 1085, 1094 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding a duty of
"trust and confidence" where a director sits on a corporate board).
144. OHagan, 521 U.S. at 649-50 (reinstating convictions for violations of SEC Rules 14e-3
and 1Ob-5).
145. Id. at 652.
146. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2011).
147. Id. § 2B1.4. & cmt. n.1; 2 WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING
§ 7:2.2, at 7-33 (2d ed. 2008).
148. See 2 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 147, § 7:2.2, at 7-33 to 7-35, 7-34 n.100 (quoting
United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. O'Hagan, 139 F.3d
641, 656 (8th Cir. 1998)).
149. HELLER, supra note 1, at 178.
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To be sure, the vagaries surrounding the government's insider
trading program shall persist. Undefined by statute °-and still
considerably less forgiving than foreign counterparts 5 '-the prohibition
driving America's unique and steadfast insider trading crusade is
nonetheless occasionally portrayed as too weak. 52 Presently, the
horizons for those pursuing insider traders perhaps may have never
seemed brighter. The Second Circuit has warned against
contemporaneous civil and criminal trials,' 53 thus perpetuating civil
investigations endlessly. Criminal penalties for insider trading may
actually increase. 54 Moreover, a June 2011 U.S. Supreme Court decision
narrowly interpreted the right to counsel so as to preclude applicability
to administrative (that is, SEC) hearings.' 55
In pursuing Rajaratnam, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District
of New York hinted at evolving investigative standards for an everevolving crime; within days of the verdict, he was quoted as saying:
"When sophisticated business people begin to adopt the methods of
common criminals, we have no choice but to treat them as such., 156 The
criminal investigation and resulting actions against the Galleon
Defendants were justified. The scheme's tactics were brazen. The
network was far-reaching (one of the Galleon Defendants remains at
large in India).157 The dollar amounts were simply astronomical. And

150. J. Scott Colesanti, "We'll Know It When We Can't Hear It": A Call for a NonPornography Test Approach to Recognizing Non-Public Information, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 539,
540-42 (2006) (noting the lack of a definition of insider trading in the Exchange Act and the present,
"largely undefined prohibition").
151. See, e.g., Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [WpHG] [German Securities Trading Act], Sept. 9,
1998, BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL. I] at 2708, last amended by Gesetz [G], June 22, 2011,
BGBL. I at 1126, art. 3, § 38(1) (Ger.), translated in Securities Trading Act
(Wertpapierhandelsgesetz-WpHG), BUNDESANSTALT FOR FINANZDIENSTLEISTUNGSAUFSCICHT,
http://www.bafin.de/nn_720786/SharedDocs/Aufsichtsrecht/EN/Gesetze/wphg10 1119_en.html
(last visited Apr. 20, 2012) (setting a limit of five years of incarceration for statutory insiders).
152. See, e.g., MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 62 (2010)

("Even as it came to dwarf the stock market, the bond market eluded serious regulation.... Bond
traders could exploit inside information without worrying that they would be caught."); Matthew
Goldstein, Steve Cohen Says Insider Trading Rules Are "Vague," REUTERS (Dec. 13, 2011, 5:56
PM EST), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/13/us-sac-cohen-deposition-idUSTRE7BCIUJ2O
111213 (describing a famed hedge fund CEO as testifying in a 2011 deposition that it can be a
'judgment call"' as to whether attractive news is inside information).
153. See supra note 48.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
155. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (holding that the due process clause does
not automatically require counsel at civil contempt proceedings in a South Carolina child support
arrears case).
156. Benjamin Weiser & Peter Lattman, U.S. ProsecutorSends a Message to Wall Street, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 2011, at BI (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. Packer, supranote 17, at 47, 51.
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insider trading is a difficult crime to prove,' 5 8 perhaps warranting the
most invasive of criminal investigative tools. Consequently, after so
the resulting
much was expended to thwart a ring so large and corrupt,
159
message to defendants has been shouted loud and clear.
But well-heeled people assembling an illicit informational network
is hardly something new to Wall Street, having been amply elucidated in
both fact 160 and fiction twenty-five years ago.' 6' The new horizons
augured by Professor Roberta Karmel in 1982 and by defense counsel in
2011 may equate to exponentially increased litigation occasioned by
multiple governmental agencies teaming up to target a business sector
such as hedge funds. 162 Generally, the SEC's partnership with the DOJ
may succeed foremost in creating a world where pivotal issues must be
tried twice; in particular, in the case of Rajaratnam, the joint efforts have
resulted in a white collar criminal reporting to jail for a minimum of ten
years, 63 having already been ordered to pay over $63 million to the
government for65 a set of transactions' 64 and another $92 million on a
subset thereof.
158. See Henning, supra note 56 (noting that, in most insider trading cases, the jury is
presented circumstantial evidence and is asked "to infer that the person traded on material nonpublic
information").
159. See id. ("[T]he government's record so far is perfect on insider trading trials in which
prosecutors relied on extensive wiretap evidence and other recordings.... The government's
victories show just how enticing that type of evidence will be for prosecutors in future cases.").
160. See generally DOUGLAS FRANTZ, LEVINE & CO.: WALL STREET'S INSIDER TRADING

SCANDAL (1987) (detailing the downfall of millionaire investment banker Dennis Levine and his
circle of professional sources of inside information in Manhattan).
161. See, e.g., WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 1987) (featuring an
Academy Award winning performance by lead actor Michael Douglas).
162. See Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellants Raj Rajaratnam and Danielle Chiesi at 7, SEC
v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 10-462-cv(L)). See generally KARMEL, supra note
15. The SEC has loudly proclaimed its intention to monitor and discipline hedge funds:
Dodd-Frank has not been the only origin of regulatory change for the hedge fund
industry. Separate from the agency's Dodd-Frank responsibilities, the SEC in recent
years has moved forward a number of regulatory initiatives of significance to hedge
funds concerning matters such as short selling; the custody of advisory client assets;
investment adviser disclosures; and political contributions by certain investment advisers
or so-called "pay to play."
Troy A. Paredes, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the Symposium on "Hedge
Fund Regulation and Current Developments" (June 8, 2011) (footnotes omitted) (transcript
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch0608lltap.htm). Separately, the DOJ
investigation of Galleon and other hedge funds spanned four years and resulted in the (sealed)
wiretaps of 655 individuals. Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellants Raj Rajaratnam and Danielle
Chiesi, supra, at 7. The wiretaps extended to the subjects' "home, office and mobile phones."
Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d at 165.
163. Henning, supra note 69.
164. Lattman, supra note 3.
165. Citing DeterrentEffect, CourtImposes Record$92M Fine on Rajaratnam, Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 2297 (Nov. 14, 2011). The SEC imposed a total amount of "monetary sanctions.., on
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Accepting the blatant illegality of Rajaratnam's tactics, the more
harrowing result still is that the promised complement of criminal and
civil investigative efforts has arguably led primarily to more work for the
under-resourced SEC. Stated bluntly, rather than supplement or lessen
Commission efforts, the criminal pleas, trial, and battles over Galleon
have led to more SEC complaints and duplicative penalties. 166 Moreover,
the exacting of leviathan monies from a well-publicized tycoon has done
little to quell the rage over Commission practices and acknowledged
failures. 167 Further, the doctrine of civil stays has actually been reconstrued to permit amplified civil actions based upon criminal results:
both the 2009 SEC Complaint and the 2011 SEC Complaint incorporate
6
language generated by preceding criminal pleas and/or indictments. 1
Finally, the successive layering of monetary fines appears subject to the
constitutional
most narrow judicial scrutiny feasible, while both ignoring
69
concerns and emphasizing the accused's lifestyle.1
In terms of the public's clamor for accountability for the ongoing
financial crisis, 17 such double-dipping in the insider trader pool seems
misplaced; in terms of the desire for a prohibition that provides clarity
and deterrence,17 ' the fighting on two fronts seems outright hazardous.
Rajaratnam in both cases" exceeding $156.6 million. Id.
166. The more frequent actions and ever-expanding fine pools do, predictably, bolster tallies
necessitated by the Commission's reliance upon congressional funding. See Press Release, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm'n, SEC Enforcement Division Produces Record Results in Safeguarding Investors
and Markets (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-234.htm (detailing the filing
of 735 enforcement actions and the imposition of over $2.8 billion in disgorgement and penalties in
fiscal year 2011).
167. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, PromisesMade, and Remade, by Firms in S.E.C. Fraud Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2011, at Al ("A Times analysis of [SEC] enforcement actions during the past
15 years found at least 51 cases in which the S.E.C. concluded that Wall Street firms had broken
anti-fraud laws they had agreed never to breach. The 51 cases spanned 19 different firms."); SEC
Folks Slide on Madoff, N.Y. POST (Nov. 12, 2011, 1:32 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/
national/secfolks slide on madoff z44DLG65xzqgd9OTgl2khK (describing the Commission's
internal disciplining of seven employees based upon its collective failure "to stop Bernard Madoffs
long-running investment fraud despite repeated warnings").
168. See supranote 27 (detailing the additional charges in the 2009 SEC Complaint inspired by
the entry of criminal pleas by certain Galleon Defendants). See also SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, 683
F. Supp. 2d 316, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that the SEC and the DOJ were "in the Government's
word, 'partner[s]' in the investigation of the underlying allegations"); Press Release, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n, supra note 87 (acknowledging the "ongoing assistance and cooperation of the U.S.
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation").
169. See, e.g., SEC v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Civ. 8811(JSR), 2011 WL 5374112, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 8, 2011) ("[T]his case cries out for the kind of civil penalty that will deprive this defendant of
a material part of his fortune.").
170. See Packer, supra note 17, at 48 (quoting award-winning filmmaker Charles Ferguson as
declaring "[t]hree years after a horrific financial crisis caused by massive fraud, not a single
financial executive has gone to jail, and that's wrong" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
171. In recent years, a number of key insider trading cases brought against "outsiders" have
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At year end 2011, residential foreclosures continued at alarming rates, 17 3
municipalities throughout the country faced the specter of bankruptcy, 173
no executive had gone to jail for any role in the financial crisis, 174 and
75
the public still feared unabated insider trading by Congress.
Alarmingly, the federal legislative response to the continuing financial
crisis has been stalled by its own weight, with less than twenty-five
percent of its reforms enacted over the seventeen months after its
passage. 176 Against this backdrop of uncertainty and excused inaction,
headline insider trading actions-like the visions before that famed
hospital patient in Catch-22-are being viewed twice. Few would argue
that hedge fund operators knowingly trading cash for unique advantage
deserve forgiveness, but many might assert that meaningful regulation
sometimes requires knowing when the battle is being aptly fought by
others (and legal resources thus better allocated elsewhere).

seen district courts and their appellate reviewers adopt diametrically opposed views on the existence
of the predicate duty. Compare SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 49-51 (2d Cir. 2009) (remanding a
Southern District of New York decision that an alleged hacker had no fiduciary duty to his corporate
victim to disclose or abstain), with SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 552, 557-58 (5th Cir. 2010)
(vacating and remanding a district court's finding that a client who was allegedly told of an
imminent corporate private placement-which would likely devalue registered corporate sharesowed no duty to the corporation to refrain from selling).
172. Kevin Simpson, Why Are ForeclosuresContinuing if Mortgage DelinquenciesAre Really
Declining?, FORECLOSURELISTINGS.COM, http://www.foreclosurelistings.com/content/foreclosures/
foreclosures-continuing-mortgage-delinquencies-declining.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2012) (noting a
foreclosure rate of 9.13 percent despite foreclosure "freezes" in certain areas).
173. Mark Curriden, The Next Chapter, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2011, at 51, 52. Mr. Curriden's article
describes a Northwestern University study estimating $3 trillion in unfunded state employee pension
funds, as well as $574 billion in unfunded local municipal government pension fund liabilities. Id.
See also Campbell Robertson et al., Bankruptcy Rarely Offers Easy Answer for Counties, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2011, at A15 (noting the difficulties confronting the recent filing by Alabama's
Jefferson County, "the largest municipal bankruptcy in American history").
174. Packer, supra note 17, at 48.
175. See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, and Duties of Entrustment,
91 B.U. L. REV. 1105, 1106 & nn.1, 4 (2011) (detailing Wall Street Journal articles in 2004 and
2010 alleging that "[c]ongressional staff are often privy to inside information" and that "senators'
uncanny ability to know when to buy or sell their shares seems to stem from having access to
information that other investors wouldn't have" (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
176. DAVIS POLK, DODD-FRANK PROGRESS REPORT
10 (2011), available at
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/e3379fb6-ab9d-4ed8-b873-0877696a8OO5/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/690130be-02e6-4037-88e8-01648c94664f/November2O 11_Dodd.Frank.
Progress.Report.pdf.
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